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NOTES
Aliens
NATURALIZATION - GOOD MORAL CHARACTER AS A PREREQUISITE
Introduction
Two recently decided cases are illustrative of the problems which arise when, in a
naturalization proceeding, there is a question of whether or not the petitioner has
established his good moral character as required by the Immigration and Nationality
Act.1 In In re Kielblock's Petition2 petitioner, an unmarried female alien, admitted that
over a period of several years she had engaged in a course of sexual relationship with
a man although she was not married to him. The court declared: "The satisfaction of
the sexual appetite is a peculiarly private matter, ordinarily concerning only the par-
ticipants in the sexual act."3 Unable to find aggravating circumstances such as adultery
or cohabitation under the applicable California statutes, prostitution, the begetting of
illegitimate children, or an open flaunting of the relationship, and finding that petitioner
bore a good reputation in the community, the court cited with approval Sudge Learned
Hand's decision in Schmidt v. United States,4 and held that, despite these acts of
fornication, petitioner had established the required good moral character entitling her
to citizenship. In our second case, Petition for Naturalization of W- ,5 the evidence
against the petitioner, an alien widow, was, among other things, that she shared an
apartment with an elderly married man and was known in the community as his wife.
Although both the petitioner and the man denied having had marital relations of any
kind, the court summarily denied her petition, holding that she had failed to establish
the required good moral character.
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the present statutory provisions and the
leading judicial decisions in order to develop a critical analysis of the present state of
the law in regard to what constitutes the requisite good moral character for naturaliza-
tion. Special emphasis will be placed upon cases involving questions of morality with
respect to sexual activity.
I. STATUTORY BASIS
The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the power to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization. 6 In the exercise of this power, Congress has conferred
exclusive jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States and courts of record
in the states and territories.7
The requirement that a petitioner for naturalization must establish his good moral
character has been in force since the earliest law on the subject,8 and is repeated in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act). 9 Most of the re-
ported litigation on the subject of naturalization has arisen from this requirement.' 0
Prior to 1952 no attempt had been made to define good moral character by statute.
1 § 316(a), 66 Stat. 242 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1952).
2 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
3 Id. at 688.
4 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
5 164 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
7 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 310(a), 66 Stat. 329, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1952).
8 Act of March 26, 1790, ch. I1. § 1, 1 Stat. 103.
9 § 316(a), 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1952). "No person . . .shall be naturalized
unless such petitioner . .. during all the period [of required residence] ... has been and still
is a person of good moral character.. .:
10 Developments in the Law of Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARe. L. Rav. 643, 710 (1953).
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However, the 1952 Act expressly excludes, as not of good moral character,"1 those who
during the five years prior to the filing of their petition (1) were habitual drunkards,
(2) committed adultery, (3) practiced or advocated polygamy, (4) engaged in, or
procured or solicited for, prostitution or other unlawful commercialized vice, (5) know-
ingly and for gain aided or abetted another alien to enter or try to enter the United
States illegally, (6) admit having committed or were convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, (7) were convicted of two or more offenses for which the aggregate
sentences of imprisonment actually imposed were five years or more, (8) were con-
victed of dealing in narcotics, (9) derived their income principally from illegal gambling
activities, (10) were convicted of two or more gambling offenses committed during
such period, (11) gave false testimony to obtain any benefits under the act, (12) were
confined to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days
or more, regardless of whether the offense or offenses (purely political offenses are ex-
cepted) for which they were confined were committed within or without such period,
(13) were convicted of murder at any time during their lifetime.
The reason for setting such definite statutory standards was that Congress desired
that in the matter of determining good moral character ... more uniform regulations
should be employed by the Service and adopted by the courts, to the end that a higher
general standard of good morals and personal and political conduct are established.12
This provision has been criticised as being too harsh and inflexible, 13 but, nevertheless,
it remains the law. And, although the law substitutes statutory mandates for judicial
discretion in many areas, courts still retain broad discretionary powers since the act
further provides: "The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes
shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good
moral character."' 4 It is in regard to this latter provision that the tests and standards
devised by the courts in the past continue to play an important role.
As to the period for which the petitioner's conduct might be examined in order to
determine his good moral character the present act declares:
In determining whether the petitioner has sustained the burden of establishing
good moral character . . .the court shall not be limited to the petitioner's conduct
during the five years preceding the filing of the petition, but may take into consider-
ation as a basis for such determination the petitioner's conduct and acts at any time
prior to that period.15
Prior to this enactment the courts had been widely split on the time period to be con-
sidered. Some held that petitioner's conduct prior to the five-year residency period was
relevant to the issue of his good moral character during the residency period.' 6 A
harsher view was that, although petitioner might have been of good moral character
during the required residency period, the court could deny naturalization solely on the
basis of misconduct prior to that period.'1 However, this view was subsequently re-
pudiated by the Fourth Circuit' s in favor of the doctrine that such prior misconduct
was relevant to, but not decisive of, the issue of good moral character during the five
years residency period. A third, and more liberal doctrine, limited the court to a con-
sideration of the petitioner's conduct during the statutory residency period.19 This liberal
view has now been rejected by the statutory provision cited above, which seemingly
adopts the position that misconduct prior to the five-year period is not a bar if the
petitioner has in fact reformed, but evidence of such misconduct should be considered
along with other evidence in determining whether petitioner has shown his good moral
character during the statutory period.2 0
11 § 101(f), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1952).12 S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 770-71 (1950).
13 1953 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 246.
14 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(f), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1952).
'5 § 316(e), 66 Stat. 243 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (1952).
16 Ralich v. United States, 185 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1950).
17 In re Lipsitz, 79 F. Supp. 954 (D. Md. 1948).
1g Marcantonio v. United States, 185 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1950).
19 Petition of Zele, 140 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1944).
20 See Petition of B., 154 F. Supp. 633, 634 (D. Md. 1957).
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Finally, in order to gather evidence relating to the petitioner's qualifications for
naturalization, the act provides for a personal investigation of his background unless
waived by the Attorney General.2' This investigation is to be conducted in the vicinity
or vicinities in which the petitioner has maintained his actual abode and in the vicinity
or vicinities in which he has been employed, or has engaged in business or work for at
least five years prior to the filing of the petition.
II. JumrciAL DECISION
A. Preliminary Concepts
The Supreme Court has held that naturalization is not the natural right of an alien
but a "high privilege" to be given, withheld, or qualified as Congress may determine. 22
Since this is true, the only right to naturalization which an alien possesses is a statutory
right which he may claim only upon the terms which Congress may impose.23
Congress is limited in the exercise of its power to set standards for naturalization
by the constitutional requirement that the law be uniform.2 4 However, this requirement
of uniformity relates to geography alone, and thus it is not violated if the act does not
apply uniformly to all races.2 5 Furthermore, the provision that, if the petitioner has
been convicted of two or more gambling offenses within the five years immediately
preceeding the filing of the petition, he is therefore ineligible for citizenship for want of
good moral character 26 is not unconstitutional even though aliens residing in an area
where gambling is permitted might be entitled to naturalization while the same acts
committed in an area where gambling is illegal would bar naturalization. 27 The reason
why this is so is that, while the law must be general and uniform in its provisions in a
geographic sense, its working and operation may be very different in different localities
owing to diverse conditions and circumstances. 28
Because citizenship is considered to be such a distinctly valuable privilege, and
because of its attendant responsibilities, Congress has seen fit to place upon the petitioner
the burden of proving compliance with all the statutory conditions.2 9 Furthermore, if any
doubts should arise as to whether or not the petitioner is qualified for citizenship, they
should generally be resolved in favor of the government and against the petitioner.30
Applying these judicial pronouncements to the provisions of the present statute
governing naturalization - a statute which has been referred to as requiring applicants
21 § 335(a), 66 Stat. 255, 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1952). A regulation of the Immigration and
Nationality Service permits district directors to waive personal investigations. 8 C.F.R. 335(c) (1958).
320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
22 United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928). Accord, Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
23 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931), overruled on other grounds, Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649 (1929), over-
ruled on other grounds, Girouard v. United States, supra; Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568,
578 (1926); Jubran v. United States, 255 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Menasche,
210 F.2d 809, 811 (1st Cir. 1954), afl'd, 348 U.S. 528 (19,55).'
24 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25 Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States, 125 F.2d 879. (9th Cir.- 1942). See Lee You Fee v.
Dulles, 236 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd per, curiam on other grounds, 355 U.S. 61 (1957).
26 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(f)(5), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(5) (1952).
27 In re Lee Wee's Petition, 143 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
28 Id. at 738.
29 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649 (1929), overruled on other grounds, Girourard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926). See Sodo v.
United States, 406 M11. 484, 94 N.E.2d 325, 327 (1950) specifically holding to the same effect in
regard to the requirement of good moral character.
30 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931), overruled on other grounds, Girourard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). "The Naturalization Act is to be construed with definite
purpose to favor and support the Government,' and the United States is entitled to the benefit
of any doubt which remains in the mind of the court as to any essential matter of fact." United
States v. Schwimmer, supra note 29; United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928).
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for citizenship to meet a greater number of conditions and to measure up to stricter
standards of personal worthiness than have faced such applicants at any time in the
country's history8 ' - it becomes apparent that the privilege of citizenship is not a
battle easily won by the alien seeking it.
B. The Standards
In applying the requirement of good moral character the courts are in general
agreement that it, like the other requirements set for naturalization, is designed to insure
that those who are granted citizenship will be worthy of this great privilege and capable
of shouldering its concomitant responsibilities. 32 The courts also generally have con-
ceded that there is a distinction between character and reputation, and that the
naturalization law imposes upon them the duty of determining the petitioner's
character.3 3 However, it must be recognized that character, being a subjective reality,
quite often is difficult to determine. For this reason the courts have been forced to rely
upon the petitioner's behavior which they quite logically treat as the external manifesta-
tion of his character and the measure of his potential worth as a citizen.
In order to determine moral "goodness" the court must examine the petitioner's
conduct by weighing it against some moral principles, and then reach a prudential
judgment as to the merits of the petitioner's request. The great difficulty inherent in
such an operation is the necessity for a judicial decision as to precisely what moral
principles are to be the standards on which the court's judgment must rest. And this
difficulty has been magnified by the absence of Supreme Court rulings on the point.
Various attempts have been made to prescribe a standard of morality that would
be fair to the petitioner while still recognizing the nation's concern as to the type of
person admitted to citizenship. An early approach to the problem was to examine
whether or not the petitioner's conduct violated a criminal statute.8 4 Although the
suggestion was made that the mere violation of a statute, regardless of its character,
evidenced a lack of good moral character, 5 exceptions generally were recognized when
this test was applied to various factual situations. Thus, some courts recognized that a
man could be of good moral character, even though he had violated a criminal statute,
if the act forbidden were malum prohibitum as distinguished from an act malum in se.36
However, other courts refused to recognize such a distinction, at least as to habitual
violaters.3 7 Refinements of this exception, similarly based upon the nature of the offense
involved, included one which made the ultimate determination depend upon whether the
31 LOWENSTEIN, THE ALIEN AND THE IMMIGRATION LAW 286 (1958).
32 See In re Nybo, 42 F.2d 727, 728 (6th Cir. 1930).
33 United States v. Hrasky, 240 I1. 560, 88 N.E. 1031, 1033 (1909), discussed in Ohlson,
Moral Character and the Naturalization Act, 13 B.U.L. R-v. 636 (1933): "Character is subjective;
reputation is objective. Character is fact; while reputation smacks of conjecture and speculation.
Character includes both natural and acquired traits; while reputation consist of opinions which
others hold of an individual .. " Despite this, it seems a petitioner's reputation may be considered
in the determination of his moral character. In re Kielblock's Petition, 163 F. Supp. 687, 688 (S.D.
Cal. 1958); Petition of B., 154.F. Supp. 633, 634 (D. Md. 1957).
34 In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (No. 13,234) (C.C. Ore. 1878).
35 Ibid. "Upon general principles it would seem that whatever is forbidden by the law of the
land ought to be considered, for the time being, immoral, within the purview of this statute."
36 In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1943). Petitioner had violated the state alcoholic
beverage control act but the court found: "the violation was not a vicious one or one which
necessarily involved moral turpitude; it was purely a statutory crime" and, therefore, did not preclude
a finding of good moral character. In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561 (E.D. Wis. 1910) (violation of a
Sunday closing law by the owner of a saloon but the law was habitually violated and no attempt
was made to enforce it in the community).
37 United States v. Gerstein, 284 111. 174, 119 N.E. 922 (1918). Petitioner was denied naturaliza-
tion on the ground of immoral character because he had habitually violated the Sunday law. It made
no difference that the law was not enforced in the community and that the violation was necessary
for the petitioner to retain his trade.
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petitioner had violated one of the "important laws" of the nation,38 and another which
recognized a distinction "between acts involving moral turpitude and economic policy,
and between acts recognized as criminal at all times and in all countries and those which
are simply violations of sumptuary, financial, or war regulations."3 9 Another exception
to the general principle that a violation of a criminal statute evidenced immoral charac-
ter was recognized by some courts in the case of unintentional or "good faith" violations.
Early cases had refused to recognize such an exception. Thus, a petitioner who had re-
married in good faith reliance upon an invalid rabinnical divorce was found to be not
of good moral character because of the bigamous nature of the resulting relationship. 40
Later courts, however, held that a petitioner who had so acted in similar circumstances
could be found to be of good moral character. 41
These exceptions, based upon the nature of the crime or upon such factors as good
faith, illustrate the development of a more liberal approach by the courts, and a tendency
to discard the old, rather mechanistic, attitude that, given the commission of a crime,
the court should find that the petitioner was not of good moral character without regard
to the particular circumstances of the case or to the petitioner's state of mind.
As these exceptions developed and the courts became less mechanical in their
application of general principles to particular cases, the basic approach of the courts to
the problem of what constituted good moral character became more apparent. The
courts, in theory at least, refuse to consult and rely on their own conceptions of right
and wrong when faced with the problem of determining the morality of a particular
petitioner's conduct. Instead, the judiciary has developed two methods of morality
judgments, both of which are designed to exclude any personal evaluation by the judge.
Some courts have held that they are bound to look to the prevailing attitudes of the
nation as a whole, i.e., the rather nebulous "common conscience."'42 Others have
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that they must look to the standards and mores of
the average citizen of the community in which the petitioner resides.4 3 The "common
conscience of the nation" test has been defended by some authors as being more con-
sistent with the fact that national citizenship is being conferred, and less likely to result
in the anomalous situation whereby an alien's choice of the community in which he will
reside, rather than his choice as to a particular line of conduct, might ultimately deter-
mine the fate of his petition for citizenship. 44 The opposing "community standards and
38 United States v. Turlel, 18 F.2d 435, 438 (D. Wyo. 1927). A violation of the National Pro-
hibition Act was held to preclude a finding of good moral character, but the court additionally con-
cluded that the violation showed a lack of attachment to the Constitution and laws of the nation.
Although the court refers to "important laws," the decision gives no adequate explanation as to what
laws are important for purposes of naturalization. Thus future courts would have no precedent to
guide them.
39 In re Bookschnis, 61 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Ore. 1945).
40 Petition of Horowitz, 48 F.2d 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Spiegel, 24 F.2d 605 (S.D.N.Y.
1928).
41 Petition of Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1947). The petitioner having entered into a
ceremonial marriage in good faith reliance upon an invalid Mexican divorce, the court held that
an intent to violate the law or a moral precept would have to be found. Petition of R., 56 F. Supp.
969 (D. Mass. 1944); Petition of Schlau, 41 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Petition of Haverly,
180 Misc. 16, 42 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (dictum). See Petition of Zele, 140 F.2d 773(2d Cir. 1944) (exception extended to a misrepresentation made in a declaration of intent in re-
liance upon advice given by an employee of the naturalization service).
42 Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1951); Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d
450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947); United States
v. Francisco, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921
(2d Cir. 1929); In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (No. 13,234) (C.C. Ore. 1878).
43 Petition of B., 154 F. Supp. 633, 634 (D. Md. 1957); In re Liknes' Petition, 151 F. Supp.
862, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Petitions of F- G- and E- E- G-, 137 F. Supp. 782, 785 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Petition of Gani, 86 F. Supp. 683, 687 (W.D. La. 1949); In re Mogus, 73 F. Supp. 150 (W.D.
Pa. 1947); In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1943); In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561, 563 (E.D.
Wis. 1910).
44 Developments in the Law of Immigration and Nationality, 66 HAxv. L. RL. 643, 710 (1953);
Ohlson, Moral Character and the Naturalization Act, 13 B.U.L. RBv. 636, 637 (1933).
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mores" test has been defended upon the ground that an alien should not be required to
live a more exemplary life than his neighbors in the community.45
Two recent cases have made use of a third test which appears to be somewhat of
a consolidation of these two tests: Do the mores and standards of the average citizen
of the community in which the petitioner resides coincide with such conduct? If not,
does the common conscience of the nation brand it as illegal? In In re Mayall's Petition46
the court, after having found that Congress had neither expressly nor by implication
branded the petitioner's conduct as immoral, looked to the mores of the community and
found that the statutory and decisional law indicated that the community regarded the
conduct as immoral. The court then proceeded to consider the "common conscience"
of the country as a whole, as embodied in the statutory and decisional law of the various
states, which revealed that the nation as a whole did not consider the conduct to be
immoral. The court concluded that the petitioner was of good moral character within
the meaning of the act. A subsequent case arising in the same district was decided
upon the same general basis. 47
This general approach to the problem, emphasizing as it does societal attitudes,
and rejecting the personal notions of the judge, has led to an enormous practical difficulty
-how is the judge to determine what society thinks on moral issues? Judge Learned
Hand, a leading exponent of this approach, 48 recognized the extent of the problem and
declared:
Our duty ... is to divine what the common conscience prevalent at the time demands;
and it is impossible in practice to ascertain what in a given instance it does demand.
* * * * Theoretically, perhaps we might take as the test whether those who would
approve the specific conduct would outnumber those who would disapprove, but it
would be fantastically absurd to try to apply it. So it seems to us that we are confined
to the best guess we can make of how such a poll would result.4 9 (Emphasis added.)
As to the wisdom of using the results of a public opinion poll, Judge Hand remarked:
"... it would not be enough merely to count heads, without any appraisal of the voters.
A majority of the votes of those in prisons and brothels, for instance, ought scarcely
to outweigh the voters of accredited churchgoers." 50 Edmond Cahn concurred in Judge
Hand's rejection of such polls in the following words:
. . . no one would expect Judge Hand to believe that Jones, Smith, Robinson, and
Brown possess ready and considered opinions on moral problems of the twilight zone,
such as arise in naturalization proceedings. No one would expect him to entertain
much respect for the offhand, unreflective answers his neighbors would probably offer.
Feeling no personal responsibility in the matter, many of them would blurt their
opinions without waiting long enough to make sure they had comprehended the
question. Even an exceptionally serious and intelligent person is liable to give a
thoughtless reply if the setting in which he is questioned conveys no sense of personal
responsibility. At the end, statistics resulting from a poll may depend on whether the
poll-taker has to be dismissed summarily because he happens to arrive when the
family's dinner is ready for the table.51
And, when the suggestion was made that sociological studies (such as the Kinsey
reports) be considered, Hand, realizing that is was societal attitudes and not conduct
which was relevant, cogently noted that common practice often diverges from precept.52
This same attitude was expressed in a more recent case which declared:
45 In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561, 563 (E.D. Wis. 1910).
46 154 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
47 In re Naturalization of Spak, 164 F. Supp. 257, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
48 See cases decided by the Second .Circuit, note 42 supra.
49 Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Repouille v. United
States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) where the court was faced with the problem of whether an
alien who had committed euthanasia was of good moral character. Judge Frank in a vigorous dissent
suggested that ethical leaders be consulted, or that the parties be allowed to present evidence on
the point of what society thought of such conduct, and which evidence should be placed in the
record which the judge might supplement in any appropriate manner.
50 Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949).
51 CAHN, THE MORAL DECIsioN 307-08 (1955). See Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 628-29 (1948);
Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 498, 510-12 (1953).
52 Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Are we to say that the common conscience of the community is merely an ex-
pression of what the community as a whole does? That would probably be wrong
because innumerable persons commit acts which they themselves would probably con-
sider acts of bad moral character. It is not a question of what the community does,
but rather what the community feels.53
However, it is not only on practical grounds that the prevailing judicial approach,
which makes societal attitudes-the test of morality, has been found wanting. The very
principles upon which it is based have been roundly criticized as fallacious.5 4 Cahn
remarks: "Speaking through the naturalization statute, the community says to the
judge, 'Ascertain whether this man has had good moral character for the past five
years.' Judge Hand's approach attempts to return the task to the community, and the
attempt proves vain." 55 Cahn suggests that the judge should indeed base his decision in
such a case on his own notions of right and wrong.56 This would not endow the judge
with an arbitrary power since he would still be required to act in a responsible manner,
and only after referring to external sources, conducting a painstaking investigation of
all the circumstances, and carefully subjecting his own customary biases to a searching
criticism.5 7 There is obvious merit in-these suggestions but, unfortunately, no court has
expressly endorsed such an approach at the present time.
C. Application of the Requirement to Particular Cases of Sexual Misconduct58
As might be expected, some cases presented to the courts have been able to be
decided without too much difficulty in view of the obvious immorality of the petitioner's
conduct. Thus, in cases involving the keeping of a house of assignation,59 incest by a
father with his teen-age daughters,"0 and exhibitionism, 6' the courts have quite readily
found that the petitioners had not sustained the burden of proving their good moral
character.
Other cases of sexual misconduct have given rise to greater difficulty. Early cases
dealing with bigamy or adultery committed unintentionally and/or in good faith reliance
upon an invalid divorce decree refused to find that the petitioner was of good moral
character.6 2 Later cases, however, adopted the more lenient view that such a person
might be found to be morally acceptable.65 And' still later there was recognition ac-
corded to the fact that certain extenuating circumstances might make a relevant dif-
ference. Thus, in Petitions of Rudder,6 4 where the paramour of one petitioner had
failed to secure the requisite consent of the court to remarry after an earlier divorce,
and where the paramours of two other petitioners were separated from their husbands
and were married to the petitioners as soon as they were freed by the death or divorce
of their former husbands, the court found that the petitioners had sustained the burden
of proving their good moral character. The fourth petitioner in Rudder did not begin
the illicit cohabitation until about seven years after he was separated from his wife
53 Petitions of F- G- and E-- E- G-, 137 F. Supp. 782, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
54 See generally CAnN, THE MoRAL DacisioN 300-12 (1955); Cahn, Authority and Responsi-
bility, 51 COLuM. L. REV. 838 (1951); 33 MAR Q. L. REv. 202 (1949-50).
55 CAHN, Tim MoRAL DECISioN 309-10 .(1955).
56 Id. at 300-12. See GRAY, Tim NATUtE AND SouRcEs op THE LAW 287-88 (2d ed. 1921). But
see CARDozo, Tim NATURE OF THE JUDIcut PRocEss 108 (1921): "My own notion is that he would
be under a duty to conform to the accepted standards -of the community, the mores of the times."
57 See generally CAHN, op. cit. supra note 55, at 300-12..
58 For an application of the requirement to other types of misconduct see Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d
244 (1952).
59 Ralich v. United States, 185 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Kornstein, 268 Fed. 172 (E.D.
Mo. 1920).
60 United States v. Vander Jagt, 135 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mich 1955).
61 In re Markiewicz, 90 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
62 See cases cited in note 40 supra.
63 See cases cited in note 41 supra.
64 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947). See In re Mayall's Petition, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957)
(petitioner, in violation of state law, married a man named as correspondent in a divorce suit brought
against her by her former husband ten years'previously, and she continued to live with him in a
familial relationship).
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who refused to give him a divorce. The court found that he also had sustained the
required burden. In this case the court emphasized the "permanence, stability, and
apparent respectability of the relationships involved . ..."65 However, where the
petitioner had committed even a single act of adultery and failed to show the presence
of extenuating circumstances, 66 or where he deserted his wife and child, whom he then
failed to support, and entered into the meretricious relationship, the court branded
the conduct as immoral. 67 The same regard for such factors as good faith and ex-
tenuating circumstances is evident in cases of incestuous marriages 68 and in cases
where marriages are invalid because of a state law forbidding miscegenation. 69
The provision of the 1952 Act declaring that one who has committed adultery
during the statutory period cannot, as a matter of law, be found to be of good moral
character 70 has given rise to questions as to its application in cases of unintentional
adultery, or adultery under extenuating circumstances. The district courts which have
ruled on the point have reached contradictory results. Several cases have held that
Congress did not intend to change the naturalization case-law definition of adultery and
have found the petitioner to be of good moral character under these circumstances. 71
Other cases have insisted upon the application of a stricter interpretation of the statutory
provision.72 The courts of appeals have not yet ruled on the point.
Finally, there have been the fornication cases. Where the petitioner's conduct
was also found to be in violation of the Mann Act, although it was a non-commercial
violation, the petitioner was found not to be of good moral character.73 However,
where the petitioner admitted to having engaged in occasional sexual intercourse with
unmarried women (the last occasion having been about six months prior), the court
refused to hold that such casual, non-adulterous lapses precluded a finding of good
moral character.7 4 In re Kielblock's Petition75 seems to extend that doctrine by finding
65 Petitions of Rudder, supra note 64, at 698.
66 Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1935). See Petition of B., 154 F. Supp. 633
(D. Md. 1957) (adultery and desertion of husband prior to the statutory period; unchaste reputa-
tion during the period).
67 Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1951); In re Matura's Petition, 87 F. Supp.
429 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
68 United State v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947) (none of the factors which make
such a marriage abhorrent, such as close and continuous family contacts prior to the marriage, were
present; the Catholic Church had sanctioned the marriage).
69 In re Application of Barug, 76 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
70 § 101 (f)(2), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (1952).
71 Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). An examination of the act
indicates that of the eight grounds (excepting adultery) for exclusion from being found of good
moral character which do not require convictions, two require a specific finding of willful intent
and the other six are of such character that the alien who commits them must know that he is
doing so and that they are condemned by the general moral feelings of the community. Under these
circumstances it would be difficult to assume that Congress meant to change the case-law definition
of adultery. While this case is partially distinguishable upon the ground that the petitioner was
seeking the suspension of a deportation order, the issue in the case involved the meaning of the
term "adultery" as used in the section of the statute "defining" good moral character. The court, at
538, cites two unreported naturalization cases to the same effect-Petition of Greenidge (S.D.N.Y.
May 2, 1955), and Petition of Racine (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1955). Accord, In re Gruelich's Petition,
37 NJ. Super. 371, 117 A.2d 316, 318 (Hudson County Ct. 1955) (naturalization case). The act
applies only to flagrant and clear cases of adulterous conduct and not to innocent situations. To
hold otherwise would interject into the act an undue harshness.
72 See In re Matura's Petition, 142 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (distinguishable in that peti-
tioner had also deserted his wife and child prior to the statutory period, had failed to contribute to
their support, and had obtained an annulment only after the statutory period had begun to run);
Petition of Da Silva, 140 F. Supp. 596 (D.N.J. 1956) (no discussion of good faith or possible ex-
tenuating circumstances); Petitions of F- G- and E- E- G, 137 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(although petitioner was entitled to have her status determined by a prior act, the 1952 Act was
found to embody the "conmmon conscience").
73 Petition of Reginelli, 86 F. Supp. 599 (D.NJ. 1949).
74 Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
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that the petitioner was of good moral character although she had engaged in a course
of sexual relationship over a period of years, and despite her apparent failure to show
the presence of any extenuating circumstances. This extension would especially appear
to be unwarranted, not only because of the absence of extenuating circumstances, but
also because of the duration and the continuous nature of the illicit relationship, as
opposed to the mere casual lapses of the petitioner in Schmidt v. United States.76
Conclusion
While the inclusion of the requirement of good moral character in the naturaliza-
tion statutes has occasioned a considerable amount of litigation, citizenship is such a
grave privilege, carrying with it reciprocal responsibilities, that it justifies, in fact de-
mands, that it be conferred only upon those aliens who are able to prove themselves
morally worthy of it. The earlier cases applied the requirement too mechanically and
without taking into consideration such relevant factors as intent, the presence of ex-
tenuating circumstances, and the possibility of reformation. Recent cases have quite
fortunately discarded this mechanistic approach, and in this respect they would appear
to be in accord with sound principles of morality. However, it is unfortunate that
these modern decisions continue to search vainly for the content of the "common
conscience' in order to reach results which are in accord therewith. It would appear
that a great deal of needless practical and prudential difficulties could be avoided if
the judges would only hearken to Cahn's suggestion that they forthrightly shoulder
the responsibility of decision on the basis of their own informed notions of morality.
There is no reason to fear that judges who take such a responsible view as that which
Cahn urges upon them would act in an idiosyncratic or irrational manner. On the
contrary, we may have cause to fear for the moral future of the nation if judges, who
have both the position and the qualifications for exerting a moral influence on the
community, should continue to regard themselves as mere mouthpieces of the un-
ascertainable "common conscience." This would be especially true if they should mis-
takenly confuse common conduct with the "common conscience."
Lawrence James Bradley
75 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958). But see Petition of Pacora, 96 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), wherein a petitioner, who for four of the five years immediately preceeding the filing of his
petition had cohabited with a woman who was unwilling to marry him, was found not to be of good
moral character. There were no extenuating circumstances since he knew that she would not marry
him, although she was free to do so.
76 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
